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JAMES S. LEAMON
T he Search for Security 
Maine after Penobscot
T h e  Penobscot cam paign of 1779 m ade little im pact on 
the military outcom e o f the A m erican Revolution. T h e  
focus o f military action was shifting to the sou thern  states 
when the British seized Bagaduce (Castine) at the m outh  
o f the Penobscot River and  defeated  the expedition 
dispatched by M assachusetts to drive them  o u t.1 For 
people in the District o f Maine, however, the Penobscot 
defeat rep resen ted  a calamity o f the first o rder. D uring 
the rest o f the war, they had  to contend  with a garrison o f 
regu lar British troops in their midst. T o  Bagaduce flocked 
loyalists who, with a vigor sharpened  by vengeance, jo ined  
the regu lars in p lu n d erin g  the coast. Active loyalist 
p a r t ic ip a t io n  in je c te d  a new  n o te  o f  p e rso n a l 
vindictiveness in what now becam e a civil war. Am id 
internal dissension and a growing sense o f isolation and  
despair, unified defense collapsed th ro u g h o u t the District. 
T h ro u g h  the  chaos, th ree  d if fe re n t so lu tions gave 
residents some hope for security. A reorganized defense 
plan and the enforcem ent o f  m artial law seem ed to o ffer 
the most im m ediate relief. C oncurrently , a new state 
constitution held out the prom ise of m ore effective civil 
governm ent. W hen these failed, several o f the easternm ost 
towns sought security by w ithdraw ing from  the war 
entirely. T h a t scheme did not work either; th rough  the 
rest of the war, Maine simply suffered  and en d u red  in 
isolation.
Massachusetts could do little to protect its eastern  
counties because the Penobscot disaster had left the state 
virtually bankrup t. T h e  M assachusetts Board o f W ar 
d ec la red  th a t it was enveloped  in “difficu lties and  
em barrassm ents inextricable, and  .. . insurm ountab le’7 in
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trying to m eet its financial obligations, and in 1781 the 
state purchasing officer repo rted  that his credit was 
exhausted and he could no longer obtain provisions 
w ithout cash.2 A bout the same time, the legislature 
received the alarm ing news tha t the state arm ories 
contained no m ore than  three h u n d red  firearm s.3 While 
the governm ent m anaged to obtain two small arm ed 
vessels to patrol the coast, neither o ffered  much hindrance 
to enemy privateers. T he com m ander o f one declared that 
his vessel “Sails so amaizing Bad tha t Every thing I gave 
Chase to will out Sail us.” A short time later, both vessels 
went up  for sale.4
W ithout m uch success, Massachusetts sought outside 
assis tance  in p ro te c tin g  th e  e a s te rn  d is tric t. T h e  
Continental Congress continued to accept the costs o f 
defending  Machias, which played a strategic role in Indian 
affairs, but declined becom ing involved in a second 
expedition against Bagaduce.5 T he idea tem pted French 
co m m an d ers  in A m erica, bu t G enera l W ash ing ton  
adam antly opposed the fu rth er expenditu re o f resources 
on so isolated an objective.6 Nearby New H am pshire 
expressed sympathy but noted that it had its own frontiers 
to d efen d .7 Consequently, the defense of Maine would 
have to come from  the District’s limited internal resources.
T he burden  of m eeting the challenge from Bagaduce 
fell sq u a re ly  on th e  c itiz en -so ld ie rs  o f  M aine, a 
re sp o n sib ility  th a t only  em p h asized  th e  m ilitia ’s 
inadequacies. Sm oldering feuds in key towns brought 
defense p rep ara tio n s to a standstill. At Machias, a 
controversy arose between civil and military authority. 
With the enem y to the east in Nova Scotia and to the west 
at Bagaduce, and with num erous towns resum ing their 
allegiance to the king, Colonel John  Allan, the com m ander 
at Machias, o rdered  in the militia to strengthen the town’s 
fortifications and to provide a garrison. Despite the
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danger o f  attack, the militia refused to obey. A spokesm an 
boldly inform ed Allan that "there was No A uthority for 
Calling in the Militia for Such Business,” and that to do so 
was an “ In fr in g e m e n t U pon the  peoples r ig h ts .”8 
A uthorities had to jail one protestor, but although he was 
soon released, Allan wrote that the controversy “Has 
E xtended the C lam our every w here to the Eastward o f 
Penobscut.”9 A year later, Allan was still noting that 
w henever he called in the militia, “Altercations Arises & 
Inflam ed by m en o f Not the Best Principles for America 
about the Lawfulness o f such things .. it Generally 
T erm inates so, as to be no Service o r use.”10 Regardless o f 
the d an g e r, M achias tow nsm en w ere no t abou t to 
s u r re n d e r  th e ir  co n s titu tio n a l sc rup les to m ilitary  
expediency, but some were willing to give up Colonel Jo h n  
Allan.
One local leader whom Allan had tried to prosecute for 
illegal trade with the Indians now sought his removal. 
Stephen Jones, chairm an of the Machias Committee of 
Safety, forw arded a series o f proposals to the General 
C ourt concerning the defense of the town. Included was a 
recom m endation that Allan be relieved o f com m and, 
presum ably so that he could spend m ore time in his role as 
superin tenden t to the eastern Ind ians.11 Allan had his 
supporters; the nearby town of N arraguagus presented a 
mem orial stoutly defending his dual ro le .12 While the 
General C ourt simply ignored Jones’s scheme, Allan was 
never free from  the gnawing fear that enemies were at 
work trying to underm ine his reputation  and force his 
removal.
In  m any respects the situation in Falm outh was similar. 
With the British at Bagaduce, Falm outh rem ained in 
constant turm oil, fearing an attack. Responsibility for 
providing a militia guard fell to B rigadier General Samuel 
T hom pson of Brunswick. A longtim e political opponent
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of Falm outh's leaders, T hom pson had caused a m ajor 
crisis ju st before the war by leading a mob into Falm outh 
to seize a British naval officer. A lthough T hom pson 
eventually released his prisoner unharm ed, the event 
undoubtedly influenced the British decision to bom bard 
the town on O ctober 18, 1775. Falm outh never forgot. 
Now, four years later, when the general was tardy in 
providing guards, town leaders thought they had a means 
of getting rid of him. Led by Falm outh, committees of 
safety claiming to represent a majority o f C um berland 
County towns m et in convention and forw arded a scathing 
indictm ent of the county militia to the General Court. 
U nder T hom pson’s direction, they declared, the militia 
was a virtual mob, unarm ed, undisciplined, and poorly 
equipped. Since the brigadier general, the colonels, and 
the majors were obviously ignorant o f their duty and .unfit 
for public service, the convention presented  its own slate 
of officers, starting with a replacem ent for T hom pson .13
In response to this attem pted purge, pro-Thom pson 
d e leg a te s , ch iefly  fro m  in la n d  co m m u n itie s  like 
Brunswick, Gorham , Gray, W indham , and Bakerstown 
(Poland and Minot), held a m eeting of their own. Claiming 
that some of them  had been excluded from  the previous 
convention, they asserted that the C um berland militia was 
as well disciplined, equipped, and led as any in the state. 
They defended  T hom pson as a “true friend  of his 
C ountry” and denied that he had discrim inated against 
Falm outh in failing to provide for its defense.14 A fter 
hearing testimony from  both sides, the General C ourt 
dismissed all accusations and com m ended the present 
militia officers fo r doing the ir best u n d er difficult 
circum stances.15 T he leaders o f m ercantile Falm outh had 
again lost in th e ir recu rrin g  strugg le  with Sam uel 
Thom pson and his rural supporters.
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T he G eneral C ourt assigned the task o f pu tting  together 
a coheren t defense from  these discordant elem ents to 
B rigadier G eneral Peleg W adsworth, the only American 
officer to em erge from  the Penobscot disaster with a 
heightened reputation. In March 1780, W adsworth was 
prom ised six h u n d red  troops, to be detached from  the 
local militia, and the authority to declare martial law in 
Lincoln County where the population showed an alarm ing 
tendency to cooperate with the enem y.16 W adsw orth’s 
plan o f defense rested on a highly realistic assessment of 
local conditions. He was aware that most inhabitants were 
well disposed to the Am erican cause, but that “they are 
Inhabitants o f a new settled Country; thinly scattered over 
the W ilderness; . . .  at a distance from  the seat o f 
G overnm ent; know but little o f what passes there; & small 
in their own eyes.” W adsworth concluded that most o f the 
settlers would willingly assist any force offering them  some 
reasonable m easure o f protection, but failing that, they 
would readily take an oath o f allegiance to G reat Britain 
ra ther than  have their property  destroyed.17
W adsw orth’s defensive m easures were designed to 
stimulate local self-confidence while also isolating the 
British in their base at Bagaduce, which he could not 
destroy. T o  dispel the sense of isolation and prom ote a 
feeling o f identity between the District and Massachusetts, 
W adsw orth  u rg e d  th a t the  g o v e rn m e n t d is tr ib u te  
new spapers am ong the m ore easterly tow ns.18 More 
im p o rtan t, how ever, he sought to isolate Bagaduce 
through  the use o f martial law and troops who used 
whaleboats to block enemy raiding parties.
O n April 18, W adsworth placed the offshore islands and 
all Lincoln County settlem ents within ten miles o f the sea 
u n d er m artial law.19 Few eastern  com m unities were 
exem pt; Lincoln County included the eastern half o f 
Maine and  W adsworth in terp reted  “the sea” to include all
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rivers a n d  inlets navigable by a rm e d  vessels. Within the 
p rosc r ibed  area,  military au thor i t ie s  could  arrest  any 
persons  of ques t ionable  loyalty a n d  subject them  to trial by 
military t r ibunals ,  which could  impose  the dea th  penalty .  
Effectively en fo rced ,  mart ial  law would have severed  
Bagaduce  from its m ain land  sources of in fo rm at ion ,  
supplies , a n d  re inforcem ents .
T o  isolate Bagaduce  by sea, W adsw orth  descr ibed a line 
across Penobscot Bay, e x te n d in g  h o r n  O w l’s H ead  to the 
so u th e rn  tip of Vinalhaven,  a ro u n d  t h e outer side of Deer 
Isle, and  to th e m ain land ,  beyond  which no  Am erican  
vessel could  legally p ro c e e d .20 However ,  the  res idents  of 
the n u m e r o u s  islands in the bay were in a d if feren t  
c a t e g o r y .  W a d s w o r t h  rec o g n i / e d  t h e i r  d e f e n s e l e s s  
situation had  induced  most of th em  to take the oath  to the 
crown. Consequen t ly ,  he p ioc la im ed  them  neutra ls ,  free 
to travel f rom  island to island a n d  to a n d  from the 
m ain land ,  fait fo rb idden  to t r ad e  with B ag ad u c e .21 As 
neutra ls ,  the is landers were p ro tec ted  f rom molestat ion by 
Am erican  forces. T h e y  had  recourse  to Massachusetts  
courts , where  they could  seek satisfaction f rom  Am erican  
troops a n d  p r iva tee rsm en  who might occasionally violate 
their neutrali ty .  In this m an n e r  the  inhabi tan ts  re ta ined  
their  rights  a n d  loyalties as citizens of Massachusetts  
despite  British control  of their region.
A l though  mart ial  law lasted only six m onths ,  au thori t ies  
seizecl a n d  c o n d e m n e d  several vessels for t r ad in g  with tfie 
enem y  a n d  a rre s ted  n u m e r o u s  individuals  e n g ag ed  in 
t reasonous  activity.22 Fen exam ple ,  Je rem iah  B aum  was 
convicted of gu id ing  a British ra id ing  party  a n d  was 
f lan g ed  at T h o r r i a s l o n .2:i Most o t h e r s  w e re  m ere ly  
d e ta in ed  an d  then released on b o n d  fen good  behavior .  
W adsw or th  sh ip p ed  d a n g e ro u s  suspects  to Boston foi 
m o re  secure  c o n f in e m e n t  than  was available in the  
( .rumbling jails of Powrralborough o r  Fa lm outh .
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M artial law, however, proved as unpo p u la r with patriots 
as with British sympathizers. As at Machias it endow ed the 
military with arbitrary power, itself a form  of tyranny. O n 
several occasions, the General C ourt in terfered  on behalf 
o f individuals arrested by W adsworth and also sought the 
release o f  confiscated  vessels. W adsw orth , reac ting  
in d ig n an tly  to the  im p lied  critic ism , d em an d ed  a 
clarification from  the G eneral C ourt concerning the 
enforcem ent of m artial law and pro tested  to the governor 
that his actions, taken only against persons known to be 
enemies to the Am erican cause, were entirely legal.24 Yet 
W adsworth was not above reproach. O n one occasion he 
im prisoned Ju d g e  T im othy Langdon for the “treasonous 
activity” o f  having issued a writ requiring the re tu rn  of 
confiscated p roperty .25
T he most serious failing with martial law was that it 
simply did not work. Despite the th rea t o f arbitrary arrest 
and the death  penalty, British sympathizers continued to 
assist the enem y and to participate in their devastating 
raids. A loyalist refugee from  T hom aston, for example, 
led a party  to his hom etown and re tu rn ed  to Bagaduce in 
trium ph with a loaded vessel as a prize.26 In the fall of 
1779 and again in 1780, Cam den refugees directed British 
raiders to the town where they burned  houses, barns, and 
sawmills, and carried off livestock.27 It happened  yet again 
a y ea r la te r . G u id ed  by two fo rm e r  re s id e n ts , a 
detachm ent of seventy-five British soldiers from  Bagaduce 
captured  C am den’s little garrison and its com m anding 
officer without firing a shot. T he raiders disarm ed the 
population, destroyed the military structures, and then 
carried most of the town’s military stores back to Bagaduce 
in cap tured  vessels.28 Perhaps the most notorious episode 
occurred in the sum m er o f 1780 when loyalists tried to 
kidnap Captain Levi Soule at his farm  on Broad Cove. 
They shot him dead when he tried to escape, and either 
w ounded or intentionally m utilated Soule’s wife when she
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tried  to aid h im .29 In retaliation, W adsworth inflicted the 
death  penalty on Jerem iah  Baum, a feeblem inded person, 
who was hardly responsible for his actions in assisting the 
enem y.30
T he severity o f m artial law seem ed only to inspire the 
enem y to g rea te r  defiance. In  1780 Jo h n  Jo n es, a 
notorious T ory  form erly o f  Pow nalborough, had  the 
bravado to re tu rn  hom e one n ight in mid-July. It was a 
hom ecom ing the town did not soon forget; Jones and his 
band of followers k idnapped the town’s leading citizen, 
Charles Cushing. Cushing was sheriff, justice o f the peace, 
and brigad ier general of the Lincoln County militia,31 and 
although he was later paro led  and exchanged, the patriots 
of Pow nalborough could no longer sleep soundly. Several 
local leaders h ired  guards, while Cushing, himself, soon 
re s ig n e d  his various offices a n d  p e rm a n e n tly  left 
Pow nalborough.32
H ad W adsw orth received the six h u n d re d  troops 
prom ised by the G eneral Court, he m ight have had  m ore 
success in enforcing m artial law and blunting enem y 
attacks. Instead, he may have received half that num ber 
and virtually no logistical support from  an im poverished 
Massachusetts. In  April 1780 he was com plaining that only 
fifty m en had arrived, despite his repeated  requests to the 
county brigadiers that they m eet their quotas.33 By the end 
o f May, W adsworth announced receipt o f some two 
h u n d red  m en who had been “d ropp ing  in by degrees for 
two M onths w ithout being  re d u c ’d to o rd e r  & 
discipline.”34 For supplies he had  cam ping utensils for 
only one h u n d red  men, ten days’ supply o f meat, and  
enough bread  to last for two days. W hen the provisions 
ran  out, the general proposed to set his men to fishing.35 
T h a t would keep them  from  starving but only at the 
expense o f  their military effectiveness. It would not keep 
them  content, however. By July  the troops at C am den had
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gone hungry  long enough. D eterm ined to leave, they 
“slung th e ir  packs,” and  only with difficulty could 
W adsworth persuade them  to rem ain .36 By the end o f the 
year, however, the troops still lacked bread and were 
“almost unfit for any duty for w ant o f clothes,” so 
W adsworth discharged them  early. Now, he observed, 
“the whole Country on either Side [of] Bagaduce from  this 
Place to Machias, but for the Inhabitants, lays open to the 
Enem y.” In disgust, he requested a discharge from  his 
com m and, stating that he found him self “quite unequal to 
the T ask , w here th e re  are  som e In tricac ies, m ore 
perplexities & much Service to be done 8c . . . but very little 
to do with.”37 However, before W adsworth could take 
leave of his com m and, the British, succeeded in capturing 
not only Captain Daniel Sullivan o f F renchm an’s Bay, the 
b ro ther o f  General Jo h n  Sullivan, but Brigadier General 
Peleg W adsworth, himself.
G uided by enemy sympathizers, twenty-five British 
so ld ie rs  s u rp r is e d  th e  g e n e ra l an d  his fam ily  at 
T hom aston on a February night in 1781. While the militia 
guard  fled at the first sight o f the enemy, the raiders had 
their hands full with W adsworth alone. A rm ed with a 
brace o f pistols, a blunderbuss, a musket, and a bayonet, 
he fought o ff the attackers, w ounding three, two of whom 
soon died. Only when shot th rough  the arm  did the 
general finally yield. His captors hu rried  him back to 
Bagaduce where they im prisoned him in Fort George with 
Major Benjam in Burton, ano ther new captive. W hen 
W adsworth recovered from  his w ound, several m onths 
later, the two captives escaped from  their prison by cutting 
through the ceiling, clam bering over the walls of the fort, 
and making their way overland to safety.38 But where in 
Maine was safety? B urton soon departed  for Boston, 
fearing that British sympathizers in his hom etown of 
C ushing m ight reveal his presence to the enem y.39
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W adsworth, already having resigned his com m and prio r 
to being cap tured , left Maine as well.
C aptain Daniel Sullivan, the militia com m ander at 
Frenchm an's Bay, fell into British hands in m uch the same 
way as had  W adsworth and Charles Cushing. Ju st before 
dawn, in late February 1781, a party from  a British 
privateer su rro u n d ed  Sullivan’s house and took him  
captive after a b rief struggle.40 In  a final effort to escape, 
Sullivan tried  to bribe his guard  “with most advantageous 
offers, such as his daugh ter to com m and etc.”41 His offer 
rejected, Sullivan had to watch in helpless frustation as the 
British fired his house and that o f a neighbor. His one 
satisfaction lay in the knowledge that the enem y had 
missed capturing  Jo h n  Allan, who had left Sullivan’s 
residence only hours before the attack.42
Jo h n  Allan narrowly escaped several British-inspired 
attem pts at capture as he labored am ong the Indians, 
trying to restore their confidence in the Am erican cause 
after the Penobscot defeat. More than ever the Americans 
needed Ind ian  support in defending  Maine, but the 
Indians were understandably  im pressed with British 
success and  distressed at the in terrup tion  o f their supplies 
from  Massachusetts. A fter the Penobscot cam paign, the 
state lacked funds with which to obtain provisions for the 
Ind ians and  the m eans to tra n sp o r t them . B ritish  
privateers operating out o f Bagaduce m ade the supply 
route between Boston and Machias precarious at best. 
Since the supplies that did get th rough  were a m ere 
fraction o f what Allan required, he was forced to extend 
his personal credit and was reduced to becoming “a Pedlar 
& Hawker, Going myself from  place to place to Collect 
Vegetables in Exchange for B utter.”43
Despite A llan’s efforts, the Indians appeared  to have 
yielded to British influence in the sum m er o f 1780 when 
many who had settled around  Machias un d er American
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hegem ony left to attend a British-sponsored gathering at 
Fort Howe on the Saint John  River.44 News that Malecite 
Indians acted as guards for workers cutting masts for the 
royal navy provided ano ther sign o f the disturb ing  
relationship developing between the Indians and the 
B ritish .45 A llan rem ain ed  reasonably  co n fid en t the 
Indians would not attack the Americans, but he believed 
th a t th e  only  th in g  p re v e n tin g  th e  B ritish  fro m  
overrunning  Maine was their fear o f the Indians. I f  that 
dread  was overcome, w arned Allan, there would be no 
holding the region.46 Fortunately, the powerful French 
presence in America provided Allan with a means of 
coun tering  British influence. Since the seventeenth  
century, the eastern Indians had draw n heavily on French 
culture and support against the English. N ow / since 
France supported  the Americans, many Indians looked 
upon the Revolution with favor, not, however, to the 
extent of becoming active belligerents. On leaving Machias 
for the Fort Howe conference, one Malecite assured Allan 
that “our Language to the Britains is from  our Lips only, 
but when we address the Americans & French its from  our 
hearts.”47 Allan consciously played on Indian fondness for 
the French and for Catholicism by obtaining the services 
of priests from French naval units operating off the New 
England coast. Allan reported  the Indians were delighted 
with the opportun ity  to participate in their familiar 
religious cerem onies, and  that they expressed “the 
Greatest Affection for the French, the Connection with 
whome, much cements their union with us.”48 In another 
dem onstration of support in 1781, the French dispatched 
a frigate to eastern waters to show the flag to the 
inhabitants, both red and white.49
T o some extent, Allan and his French connection 
proved too successful. By the end of 1780, almost four 
hundred  Indians had gathered around  Machias; all had to 
be provisioned from  the scanty American resources.50 T he
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d if f ic u lty  o f  p ro c u r in g  a d e q u a te  su p p lie s  fro m  
M assachusetts th rea tened  to undo  A llan’s diplomacy. He 
repo rted  discontent and  uneasiness am ong some o f the 
Indians who again had  begun drifting  back to the Saint 
Jo h n  for the m ore plentiful provisions provided by the 
British.51 In  the spring o f 1782, Allan, “destitute of 
subsistence,” sent a special representative to Boston to 
plead for supplies. A year later he personally appeared  
before the governor and the legislature to beg for support 
in keeping the Indians from  British co rrup tion .52 Despite 
th e ir  w av e rin g , h o w ev er, th e  In d ia n s  re m a in e d  
non-belligerent th roughou t the en tire  war.
A lthough unspectacular, Indian  neutrality  was a victory 
for the Am ericans, who constantly feared  British-incited 
Ind ian  raids on the eastern  fron tier. T o  credit this 
accom plishm ent to Jo h n  Allan and  the French, however, 
ignores the fact the Indians never had  any intention of 
participating in the war; therefore, non-belligerency was a 
victory fo r Ind ian  diplom acy as well. A llan’s special 
trium ph was in convincing the Indians that, despite the 
defeat on the Penobscot, the provisions undelivered, and 
the prom ises unfulfilled, the Am erican cause rem ained a 
viable alternative to that o f the British, thus leaving the 
Indians to follow their own neutralist inclinations. It also 
m eant that enough Indians rem ained around  Machias to 
protect the eastern approaches, while the rest of Maine lay 
open to the enemy.
M aine’s search for military security coincided with a 
statewide effort to find political security th rough  a new 
c o n s titu tio n a l o rd e r .  M ore th a n  m ost a reas  o f 
M assachusetts, Maine had reason to feel neglected, even 
abused, by the governm ent; but convinced of its own 
inferiority and engrossed in the immediacy of war, Maine 
d id  no t play a lead ing  role in the m ovem ent fo r 
constitutional reform . Paradoxically, the im petus for 
change cam e from  tha t p art o f M assachusetts least
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touched by war, W orcester, H am pshire, and  Berkshire 
counties. Separation from  Britain stim ulated agitators 
there to dem and a governm ent m ore expressive o f the 
popular will than the old royal charter o f 1691, which, 
even w ithout a governor, still served as the basis of 
g o v e rn m e n t. T h ro u g h  n e w sp a p e rs , p e titio n s , 
conventions, and  the d isru p tio n  o f the courts, the 
w esterners p rodded  the rest o f the state into action. In  the 
sp r in g  o f  1777, tow ns th ro u g h o u t  M assach u se tts  
authorized their delegates to the G eneral C ourt to assume 
responsibility for drafting  a constitution, which would 
then be re tu rn ed  to the towns for ratification.
T he fram e of governm ent re ferred  to the towns in 1778 
was a com prom ise between the dem ocratic aspirations of 
the western, rural, and underdeveloped regions and the 
m ore conservative interest o f the commercial east. T he 
w esterners favored a b road  franchise, a unicam eral 
legislature, and a weak governor; the easterners advocated 
high property  qualifications for voting and for holding 
office, a bicameral legislature, and a powerful governor.53 
In an effo rt to satisfy both positions, the General C ourt 
proposed a weak governor presiding over a bicameral 
legislature. T h e  franchise for the lower house included all 
tax-paying adult white males, but for the up p er house and 
chief executive, voters had to possess property  worth <£60. 
O fficeholders had to own property  ranging from  £1,000 
for the governor to £200  for representatives.54 In the 
spring o f 1778, the towns overwhelmingly rejected this 
plan. T h e  com prom ise alienated m ore people than it 
satisfied, and there was a growing conviction that drafting 
a constitution was too im portan t a task for a mere 
legislature. T o do the job  properly required a convention 
elected especially for that purpose.55
Maine towns generally concurred with the repudiation 
of the new constitution, and their responses reveal the
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political opinion of the District ju s t before the British 
occupation o f Bagaduce (see table below). Overall, the 
re tu rns from  Maine suggest that interest in the new fram e 
of governm ent and in political dem ocracy progressed in 
an easterly direction from  York to Lincoln County, from  
the commercial to the less com mercial areas. Tw enty-four 
Maine towns voted on the constitution: five in York 
County, eight in Cum berland, and eleven in Lincoln. T he 
percentage o f voter participation also increased in the 
sam e d irection : York C ounty averaged  25 percen t; 
C um berland, 27; and  Lincoln, 29. Willingness to accept 
constitutional change followed the same pattern . Not a 
single town in York County favored the new fram e of 
governm ent. Two towns in C um berland voted approval, 
while five in Lincoln County indicated that the proposed 
plan was m ore acceptable than the status quo.56 Finally, 
Georgetow n and Boothbay, both in Lincoln County, 
p ro d u ced  the m ost v ib ran t expressions o f  political 
democracy. O ne o f the reasons Georgetown rejected the 
new fram e o f governm ent was that “a Man being born in 
Afraca, India or ancient America or even being much 
Sun b u rn t  d e p r iv e d  h im  o f  h av in g  a V ote fo r 
Representative.”57 In Boothbay, sixty-three townspeople 
unanim ously opposed any institution, such as a senate or 
council, which limited or “corrected” the m ore num erous 
representatives o f the people. This lively concern with 
popular liberties also convinced the town to propose 
elim inating the positions o f governor and lieutenant 
governor. T he offices were expensive and "needless in a 
free State,” and, what is worse, potentially “dangerous to 
the liberties of the People.”58
Only G orham  m atched Boothbay’s political radicalism, 
and that occurred the following year when many towns 
w ere in stru c tin g  the delegates elected to a special 
convention charged with drafting  a new constitution. 









York 327 147 4 X
Kittery 561 64 11 X
Wells 611 118 19 X
Pepperell 177 56 32 X




Falmouth 669 68 10 X
Brunswick 192 78 40 X
Cape Elizabeth 402 31 8 X
New Gloucester 134 109 81 X
Pearsonstown 70 21 30 X
Gorham 321 55 17 X
N. Yarmouth 386 84 22 X












Winthrop 108 21 19 X
Edgecomb 127 15 12 X
Vassalborough 116 26 22 X
Bristol 234 103 44 X
Booth bay* 179 63 35 X
Blue Hill 44** 26 59 X




^Identified as Townsend in Greene and Harrington, American 
Population, p. 39 
**Polls from 1776 census
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C um berland County and a particular critic of Falm outh. 
Its radicalism reappeared  in 1779 when it advocated a 
unicam eral legislature on the m odel o f  the ancient 
Hebrews or the uncorrup ted  Roman senate. Governors 
and  council w ere “no t only u n n ecessa ry  [sic] bu t 
inconvenient, and perhaps dangerous,” and the town 
expressed the hope that “they will never exist in this 
state.”59
M aine’s statistical and political response to the 1778 
constitution, contains considerable variation, but the 
results suggest that political dem ocracy and a desire for 
constitutional change existed m ore strongly in downeast 
Lincoln County than  in coastal York and Cum berland 
counties. In effect, there was an affinity of interest 
between M aine’s fron tier areas and the w esternm ost 
counties o f Massachusetts, which became more im portant 
and potentially dangerous in the postwar era. For the 
present, however, these characteristics were obscured by 
the traum a o f invasion, internal disorder, and the problem  
of wavering Indian loyalties.
These wartim e crises preoccupied much o f Maine 
during  1780 while the state convention met and drafted  
the new constitution, which was subm itted to the towns in 
the sp rin g . Since eas te rn  delegates co n tro lled  the 
convention, the new constitution was no com promise. It 
was based on the concept o f a separation o f powers, 
providing for a powerful governor with authority to make 
appointm ents and veto legislation, a bicameral legislature 
represen ting  population in the lower house and property  
in the senate, and an independen t judiciary, appointed by 
the governor and his council and holding office during  
good behavior. P roperty qualifications for holding elective 
office were com parable to those in the rejected plan of 
1778, and  the franchise was limited to adult white males 
having an annual income of £ 3  or owning property  worth 
£60. T h e  docum ent’s long pream ble guaran teed  such
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fundam ental rights as the freedom  o f worship for all 
C h ris tian s , b u t, paradox ica lly , the  leg is la tu re  was 
em pow ered to enforce this freedom  by taxation.60
Reaction to the new constitution was complex and 
difficult to evaluate. Some towns voted on the entire 
docum ent; others did so article by article but failed to 
come to an overall conclusion. Still others approved the 
docum ent conditional to the acceptance o f proposed 
am endm ents. T he constitutional convention was left with 
the task o f making sense out o f these responses. In 
tabulating the returns, it made sure its labors were not 
wasted. O n Ju n e  16, it declared the constitution ratified; 
on O ctober 25, the new fram e of governm ent took 
effect.61
In his study o f politics in revolutionary Massachusetts, 
Stephen Patterson implies that M aine’s favorable reaction 
to the 1780 constitution resulted from  the influence 
exercised in the District by the commercial interests of 
eastern Massachusetts.62 Such m ight have been the case 
under norm al circumstances, but conditions in Maine 
were anything but norm al in 1780. Lincoln County, for 
example, was under martial law, subject to devastating 
raids from  Bagaduce, and virtually severed from  the rest 
of the state. Cum berland County, too, was unsettled, 
nervously expecting a British descent upon Falmouth. 
Only York appeared unaffected, although it was deeply 
concerned  about conditions to the eastw ard. T hese 
im m ediate realities, more than an eastern commercial 
influence, shaped the response o f Maine towns to the 1780 
constitution.
T he voting patterns established in 1778 completely 
broke apart in 1780 (see table below). Fewer towns and 
people took an interest in the second constitution, and the 
results show no coherent pattern. Only seventeen towns 









Arundel 246 — — X
Berwick 756 28 4 X
Biddeford 215 10 5 X
Buxton 183 49 27 X
Sanford 209 — — X * *
W ells 591 74 13 X
Kittery 574 80 14 X




Falmouth 556 83 15 X
Cape Elizabeth 292 28 10 X
Gorham* 363 53 15 X ?
Brunswick 206 — —




Pownalborough 300 49 16 X
Vassalborough 136 — — X
Thomaston 80 — —
Waldoborough 135 — —
Edgecomb 132 20 15 X




*See Gorham Town Records, April 25, May 24, 1780, MeSA. 
Forty-seven townspeople voted to accept and six to reject the 
report of the committee on the constitution. The town records 
do not include the report but the Boston Gazette, June  12, 1780, 
published a report on the constitution by a committee from 
Gorham, probably the one noted in the town records. The re­
port is sharply critical of  what it calls the constitution’s "spiritual 




C um berland, and five in Lincoln. V oter participation also 
declined from  an average of 26 percen t in 1778 to about 
14 percen t in 1780, with Lincoln County again recording 
the highest average participation and York the lowest. 
Nonetheless there is no significant east-west progression 
o f towns opposing the new constitution. O f the six that 
disapproved two were in York, one in Cum berland, and 
three in Lincoln County. Since four o f the opposing towns 
registered their disapproval by refusing to pass a vote, the 
basis o f their opposition is unclear.63 Only Pownalborough 
in Lincoln County and Buxton in York explained their 
reservations. For Pownalborough, “the invasions o f the 
Enem y and  the Divisions am ong ourselves m ade it 
im proper if not dangerous at this T im e to introduce a new 
m ode o f governm ent.”64 Buxton, a relatively new town, 
defined its opposition in political term s. Located in York 
County ju s t southwest o f G orham , the town produced 
M aine’s only radical criticism o f the 1780 constitution, 
explaining that “the Legislative A uthority ought not 
consist o f More branches thane [sic] One H ouse” because 
“the Inconveniency arising in Negatives and Long debates, 
is m ore Injurious to the Good people of this State than 
E rrors which may be Com m itted without Such Separate 
branches.”65
While York County produced the most radical of 
M aine’s responses to the constitution of 1780, it also 
produced the most conservative. A lthough the town of 
Wells approved the constitution, it recom m ended an 
am endm ent that would grant the governor an absolute 
veto over all acts of the assembly. Claiming to speak on 
behalf o f small towns distant from  the capital and seldom 
represented , Wells feared legislative tyranny m ore than 
executive tyranny. Wells idealized the chief executive as 
“the Sole Representative o f the whole Com monwealth; 
T h e  C enter o f the Union to all the several parts and 
m em bers o f the political Body; . . the G uardian o f the
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Constitution and of the Rights and  Interests o f the whole 
State.” In the governor, every town ‘‘shall always have a 
R epresentative,” one in whom any town, regardless of size, 
‘may claim an equal In te re s t. . . with the o ther parts of the 
State.”66 By idealizing the governor and setting him above 
faction and  self-interest, Wells tried  to solve the problem  
of representation  that Buxton answered with a unicam eral 
legislature unfettered  by senate or governor. O ne view was 
“radical,” the o ther “conservative,” but their objectives 
were similar.
T he striking contrast between the retu rns o f 1778 and 
those o f 1780 reveals the impact o f the war on Maine. T he 
retu rns o f 1780 are a m easure o f the chaos within Maine 
society. They fail to perpetuate  any o f the earlier patterns 
and do not establish any new ones. In addition there is no 
consistency in attitude regarding  the two constitutions. 
T he radicals o f 1778, like Boothbay, are silent in 1780 or, 
like Georgetown and Gorham , supporters o f the m ore 
conservative second fram e of governm ent. On the o ther 
hand, Wells and Buxton, the extremists of 1780, were 
silent or unexceptional in 1778. T he two sets o f returns 
are illustrative of widely differing conditions in Maine; 
those from  1778 m ore accurately reveal M aine’s political 
attitudes; those of 1780, M aine’s disruption.
Collectively, the com bined re tu rns emphasize that a 
sizeable majority o f M aine’s electorate, 73 to 85 percent, 
failed to participate in the two constitutional debates. O f 
course the deteriorating military situation in 1780 helps to 
explain the increase in nonparticipation, but even in 1778 
a rem arkable num ber of people stood aside. Some thought 
it was a poor time to be tam pering with the form  of 
governm ent, for the “hurry  of war did not perm it that 
calm deliberation necessary to form  a constitution for a 
governm en t o f d u ra tio n .”67 M ore frequen tly , towns 
revealed a p ro found  sense o f inferiority, a feeling that 
may have deterred  their consideration o f so weighty a
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m atter. No one pu t it as poignantly as the selectman of 
Blue Hill, who, in 1778, apologetically forw arded his 
town’s re tu rn  with the com m ent, “Sur and if there is Aney 
thing tha t we have O m m etted in the R eturn  I W ould have 
you Let us know . . . for we Are so as it ware O ut of the 
W ourld tha t we Dont hardley know W ither we Do Rite or 
Rong But we m ean to Do as Well as We C an.”68 In 
addition, bad w eather discouraged some people from  
attending meetings, but others were simply too busy 
fishing, farm ing, and m aking a living to be bo thered .69 
This sense of detachm ent, isolation, and inferiority had 
deep roots in the com munities o f  Lincoln County. As 
Peleg W adsworth aptly observed, many of them  were far 
rem oved from  the seat o f governm ent, ignoran t o f what 
went on there, and were “small in their own eyes.” For 
them  neither m artial law nor state constitutions offered 
any hope o f relief from  a situation rapidly becoming 
intolerable. For such towns, the only o ther rem edy was 
withdrawal from  the war.
By mid-M arch 1781, such a proposal was in circulation 
am ong some o f the Lincoln County towns. Jo h n  Allan 
re p o r te d  th a t ru m o rs  o f  n e u tra lity  w ere c rea tin g  
confusion and setting com m unities “m uch upon  the 
wavering H and .”70 T he proposal came from  Francis Shaw, 
Jr., o f Gouldsborough, m erchant, colonel o f militia, and 
chairm an of the town’s committee of correspondence, 
safety and  inspection. Shaw claim ed to have had a 
conversation with Jo h n  Hancock, the new governor o f 
Massachusetts, about conditions downeast and quoted him 
as saying that since the state was unable to protect the 
eastern com munities the inhabitants had an “undoubted  
R ight” to make the best term s possible for the protection 
o f life, family, and p roperty .71 Shortly after the British 
had  k idnapped  Captain Sullivan from  Frenchm an’s Bay, 
com mittees from  that and the neighboring com munities o f 
G ouldsborough, N arraguagus, and  N um ber Four m et to
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d r a f t  a p e t it io n  re q u e s tin g  b o th  th e  B ritish  a n d  
M assachusetts to recognize a condition o f neutrality from  
P en o b sco t Bay to th e  S ain t C ro ix  R iv e r.72 I f  th e  
convention sent a proposal to the British at Bagaduce, no 
copy now exists, bu t Francis Shaw sent one to Machias with 
instructions that it be forw arded to several o ther Lincoln 
County towns.
T h e  neu tra lity  ag reem en t rested  squarely  on  the 
prem ise tha t “Allegiance & protection are Reciprocal” and  
inseparable. T h e  eastern  towns declared tha t they had 
suffered  m ore than their share for the com m on cause, and 
tha t M assachusetts had  been as unresponsive to their 
repeated  requests for assistance as the British Parliam ent 
had  been to the p rew ar petitions from  M assachusetts 
asking fo r redress. Instead  o f  receiving help, the eastern 
towns had  been subjected to p lundering , devastation, and 
“the add ition’l G rievance” o f  m artial law. T he petition 
th e re fo re  co n c lu d ed  th a t . . th e  G o v ern m en t o f  
M assachusetts (from  what cause is totally Im m aterial,) 
have Refused o r Neglected to give Protection to us the said 
Inhabitants in R eturn  for ou r Allegiance, so that in ju s tic e  
to o u r selves, ou r Familys, & Posterity founded  on the 
Universal C oncurrance o f Nations we are constrained to 
Ask o f  y o u r E xce llency  8c H o n o u rs , an  A ct o f  
N eutrality .”73 By draw ing on revolutionary precedent and 
by an appeal to first principles, the neutralists defended  
the ir w ithdrawal from  the war. It may have seem ed like a 
reasonable scheme given the prevailing circum stances bu t 
in Machias it caused a storm  o f opposition.
T h ere , ou traged  patrio tism  b ro u g h t the neutrality  
m ovem ent to a halt. In a series o f resolutions directed to 
the neighboring towns and to G overnor Hancock, a “very 
full” town m eeting expressed its “utm ost abhorence” o f 
neutrality. Sweeping aside all theoretical justifications, the 
m eeting accused Francis Shaw o f having had “private 
In terest at heart, m ore than  the good o f his C ountry .” T he
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townspeople em phasized their own loyalty to the cause of 
freedom  and declared it “an indisputable tru th , those that 
are not for us, are against us.”74 Led by Stephen Jones, the 
Machias C om m ittee o f C orrespondence, Safety, and  
Inspection, d rafted  an accom panying letter to the resolves 
that again denounced Shaw and accused him, N athan 
Jo n e s  o f  J o n e s b o ro u g h , an d  W illiam  N ickells o f  
N arraguagus, o f conspiring to restore the region east o f 
Penobscot Bay to British control in o rd er to continue their 
trade with the enem y without fear o f in te rru p tio n .75
From  the start Francis Shaw had been concerned that 
M achias m ight oppose the neu tra lity  p roposal. T o 
Stephen Jones, Shaw had w ritten, “how it may be Receiv’d 
by your Tow n I can’t Say, (As they are in part Supported) 
But I dare say it will be Agreed to this way, as we are not, 
nor cannot be pro tected .”76 Shaw’s distinction is im portant 
in explaining Machias’ adam ant opposition to neutrality. 
T h e  w ar h ad  a ffe c te d  M achias d if fe re n tly  th a n  
n e ig h b o rin g  towns. G o u ld sb o ro u g h , Jo n esb o ro u g h , 
N um ber Four, N arraguagus and F renchm an’s Bay were 
vulnerably located within easy reach o f British privateers. 
Physically and psychologically the war had taken a heavy 
toll upon these isolated settlements. To some extent 
Machias shared many of the same tribulations, but the war 
enhanced the town’s im portance. Indeed, it became even 
m ore im portant than Pownalborough, the county seat. 
Machias was the easternm ost fortified town in Maine, a 
haven for Nova Scotian refugees, a staging area for 
invasions of British-held territory, and, most im portantly, 
a bastion against British invasion. As long as M athias held 
out, the smaller neighboring settlements took strength, 
and the British could never control the region. Machias 
could hold out as long as the Indians rem ained friendly, 
but their friendship depended largely on the provisions 
and diplomacy adm inistered by Jo h n  Allan at Machias. 
T h e  town was so strategically im p o rtan t that both
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M assachusetts and the C ontinental Congress contributed 
to its defense. Screened by friendly Indians, supported  by 
state and nation, and situated well up the Machias River 
beyond  easy reach  o f u n fr ie n d ly  vessels, M achias 
understandably  assum ed an uncom prom ising attitude 
toward such trim m ers as Shaw, Jones, and Nickells, whose 
neutrality scheme would undo the town's new found 
im portance.
T he opposition o f Machias effectively destroyed the 
neutralist m ovem ent, which was w eakened from  the 
beginning by the dubious motives and reputations of its 
leaders. N eutralism  is both elusive and dangerous in a war 
where morality has become polarized. Enemies at least 
hold to some principles, erroneous as they may be. 
Neutrals, however, are open to the charge of being 
without principles and of seeking the best o f both sides 
without risk of personal com m itm ent. As the town of 
Pleasant River phrased  it, neutrals were interested in 
catching the hare while o ther beat the bush .77 Only the 
sta te  co u ld  bestow  n e u tra lity  w ith o u t ta in tin g  its 
beneficiaries with self-interest. W adsworth had m anaged 
this for the residents o f Penobscot Bay. In  that case, 
n e u tra lity  co in c id ed  w ith  th e  best in te re s t  o f  
Massachusetts; it provided a subtle m eans o f preserving 
loyalty w here the state had no effective power. O n the 
o ther hand , the Shaw , Jones, and Nickells proposal for the 
inhabitants east o f the Penobscot worked to their own 
personal advantage and not to tha t o f the state. W hen 
Machias quickly exploited this weakness the adheren ts fell 
away, fearing the accusations o f their neighbors m ore than 
enem y raids. Even Francis Shaw sought to hide behind 
anonym ity o f a com m ittee decision.78
T he only neutralist m ovem ent able to w ithstand popular 
hostility em an ated  from  the Society o f f r ie n d s , o r 
Q uakers. T h eir refusal to take sides in the Revolution 
arose from  Christian pacifism and  an extrem e religious
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dem ocracy, principles for which the sect was well known, 
even notorious. Long before trouble erup ted  between 
Britain and  h er colonies, Q uakerism  had spread to Maine 
and expanded  rapidly during  the war. By 1768 Falm outh 
Q uakers were sufficiently num erous as to requ ire  a 
m eeting house 40-by-32-feet square with a gallery.79 T he 
1777 census listed sixty-four Q uakers in Falm outh who, by 
1781, were forced to enlarge the ir m eeting house once 
again.80 In  many towns Q uakers actively resisted public 
taxation fo r support o f the established church, and by 
onset o f the Revolution, they had won exem ption from  
re lig io u s  ta x a tio n  in  W in d h am  an d  F a lm o u th .81 
N ev erth e less , th e  F a lm o u th  Q u ak e rs  co n tin u ed  to 
p ro v o k e  ex c item en t an d  co n tro v ersy  by a tte n d in g  
Congregational services where they ostentatiously refused 
to rem ove th e ir  hats and  tr ie d  to prosely tize the 
congregation.82
D uring the war they aroused even m ore resentm ent by 
refusing to  pay war taxes, to serve in the military, and to 
take loyalty oaths to the A m erican  cause. Q u ak er 
N athaniel Palm er o f Bristol defended  his inability to take 
the loyalty oath in a moving address to the authorities. “I f  
I shuld affairm  to Be true  to w ar,” he wrote, “then I Shuld 
make Ship wrack o f faith and good Conchance: for Love is 
that New Com m and, which I hope I have Received Ritten 
on my h ea rt —that I Shuld Love one another: But your 
Law my friends Strikes as the very Scorce and foundation 
o f all my Religion which is my Live [life].” Palmer declared 
his abhorrence of “W higs” and “T ories” as “Revengeful 
Parties distroying Eaich o ther,” yet he affirm ed he was a 
“true and  Reall friend to my C untry” and would never 
assist its enem ies.83 T he local authorities and the General 
Assembly rem ained skeptical; Palm er testified to his 
convictions by going to jail.
Palm er's experience was not unique. A lthough Q uakers 
had a repu tation  am ong critics fo r personally profitting
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from  their pacifism, they frequently gave witness to their 
principles by subm itting to the d istrain t o f p roperty  for 
their refusal to pay military taxes, and  they disciplined 
th e ir  ow n m em bers w ho a tte n d e d  auc tions w here  
co n fisca ted  Q u ak e r  goods w ere  so ld .84 W hen the  
selectmen o f Berwick divided their town into groups or 
“classes/’ each to provide a recru it for the army, the 
officials lum ped all the Q uakers into one “class,” confident 
they would default and thereby face fines and fu rth e r 
losses o f p roperty  for persevering in their religious 
scruples.85
T he Q uakers m aintained their pacifism and neutrality 
th roughou t the Revolution, and they sought no escape 
from  hardship . Indeed , they accepted public resentm ent 
and legal harrassm ent as both a test o f their own spiritual 
convictions and as a means of witnessing to their religious 
beliefs. In  glaring contrast, the secular neutralism  of 
Francis Shaw was an effort to escape the burdens o f a 
cause he and his adherents had  once espoused; no m atter 
how justified, Lincoln County neutralism  appeared  to be 
desertion. Belatedly, the neutralists discovered that their 
proposals, far from  offering an escape, were far m ore 
burdensom e than they had ever anticipated or were 
willing to accept.
Only an end to the war brought relief to the District o f 
Maine, but in 1782 and  early 1783 peace seemed a long 
way off. W hen Ind ians from  C anada attacked the 
settlem ent o f Sudbury Canada (Bethel) in late sum m er 
1781 trem ors o f fear rippled across the fron tier.86 Machias 
was in no condition to inspire confidence; its defenses 
were “deplorable.” It had but one officer and six soldiers 
to garrison a fort containing but five small arms in 
working o rd e r .87 A C um berland County convention, held 
in February 1783, expressed fears that Lincoln County 
m ight soon be too discouraged to resist the enemy any 
longer. I f  that were to happen, C um berland would face an
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enemy who appeared  to be growing more vigorous as the 
war w ound down elsewhere. W ithout adequate defenses, 
the C um berland delegates expressed hope that “a part of 
the Continental Forces may be spared to defend this 
no rthern  State to which the attention of the Enemy now 
seems to be directed.”88 U nfortunately, no help appeared; 
no one outside of Maine much cared what happened  
there.
Even Massachusetts seemed to lose interest. Britain and 
the U nited States signed a prelim inary peace treaty in 
Novem ber 1782, the provisions of which were em bodied 
in the definitive treaty of Septem ber 1783. T he British 
and their Loyalist allies, however, lingered at Bagaduce 
until 1784 w ithout any official p ressu re  to depart. 
Precisely when the last British detachm ent withdrew is not 
entirely clear. Two authorities suggest January , but as late 
as March 23, 1784, a resolve in the Massachusetts council 
referred  to the British evacuation in the fu ture tense.89 No 
American official was on hand when the British finally 
d e p a r te d , and  no sta te  o ffic ia l fo rm ally  assum ed  
possession o f the abandoned post until Samuel McCobb 
came over from  Georgetown in the spring to make an 
inventory o f what rem ained.90 Even then Maine was not 
entirely free of its foes. T he troublesom e Bagaduce 
loyalists moved only as far as Passamaquoddy Bay where 
thev established Saint Andrews on the east side o f the 
Saint Croix River. T he bitter legacy of Bagaduce festered 
for the next fifteen years while the British and Americans 
quarreled  over w hether the settlem ent encroached on 
American territory, as John  Allan furiously insisted. An 
international commission finally ended the dispute in 
1798 by declaring the Saint Croix as the boundary 
between Maine and New Brunswick, thereby confirm ing 
the legality of the loyalist com m unity .91 T he larger
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boundary issue between Maine and Canada, however, 
dragged on for another  forty years before finally being 
resolved.
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BOOK REVIEWS
Pamphlets for the People: A Review Essay on the 
Pub lica t ions  o f  Maine H is tor ic  P re se rva t ion  
Com mission.
T h e  Maine legislature created the Maine Historic 
Preservation Commission in 1971 to administer  the 
National Register program in Maine. T he  commission 
surveys historic ,  a rch i tec tu ra l ,  an d  archaeological  
resources, nominates the most significant ones to the 
National Register of Historic Places, and administers a 
federal grants-in-aid program for the restoration of 
important buildings and  the excavation o f  potential 
archaeological sites. Despite a limited budget, the director 
and his small staff have made great strides in identifying 
historic and architecturally significant buildings by 
working closely with local preservation and historical 
organizations. Lately, the commission has placed more 
emphasis on identifying and excavating Maine’s rich 
archaeological sites.
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